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DEDUCTIONS OF INTEREST IN COMPUTING NET INCOME FOR THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX
Among the deductions from gross income which an individual
or a corporation is 4llowed to make in computing net income for
purposes of the federal income tax is "all interest I paid or ac-
I Interest paid on delinquent taxes is deductible. Evans & Howard Fire
Brick Co. v. Commissioner, 8 B. T. A. 867 (1927) ; see Northwestern Motor
Car Co. v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 1276, 1281 (1929). But cf. Kossar &
Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B. T. A. 952 (1929).
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crued2 within the taxable year on indebtedness, 3 except on in-
2 The taxpayer is privileged to render his returns on either the cash
receipts and disbursements or the accrual basis, provided that his true in-
come is clearly reflected. If books are kept and returns rendered on the
cash receipts and disbursements basis, only interest paid within the taxable
year may be deducted. Appeal of Seaboard Oil Co., 1 B. T. A. 1259 (1925) ;
Appeal of Utah Orpheum Co., 3 B. T. A. 1041 (1926); Appeal of Georgia
State Savings Ass'n, 4 B. T. A. 748 (1926); J. Kearsley Mitchell v. Com-
missioner, 19 B. T. A.-(Feb. 27, 1930). If the accrual basis is used, only
interest accrued within the tax year may be deducted. Appeal of Tel-
Electric Co., 1 "B. T. A. 434 (1925) ; Appeal of John W. Butler, Inc., 1 B. T.
A. 1105 (1925); 'Appeal of North Wayne Tool Co., 2 B. T. A. 366 (1925);
Appeal of McIntosh-Seymour Corp., 2 B. T. A. 953 (1925); Appeal of Cum-
berland Glass Mfg. Co., 2 B. T. A. 1122 (1925); Appeal of H. Harwood &
Sons Inc., 2 B. T. A. 1293 (1925); Appeal of Higginbotham-Bailey-Logan
Co. v. Commissioner, 8 B. T. A. 566 (1927); Appeal of Saner-Ragley Lum-
ber Co., 3 B. T. A. 927 (1926); George D. Davidson Co. v. Commissioner,
14 B. T. A. 91 (1928); cf. Appeal of Raymond-Hadley Corp., 4 B. T. A.
889 (1926). If the taxpayer changes from the cash disbursements to the
accrual basis, interest accrued before such change and paid after the
change can not be deducted. Appeal of National Bank of N. J., 1 B. T. A.
1238 (1925). Where payments of principal are due in one year and pay-
ments of interest, due in a subsequent year, are contingent upon some event
occurring in the latter year, such interest is deductible in the latter' year,
even though returns are made on the accrual basis. Concord Electric Co.
v. Commissioner, 7 B. T. A. 1027 (1927). If the basis on which the ac-
counts are kept does not clearly reflect the true income, the taxpayer may
be ordered to recast its accounts on another basis. Appeal of Comstoqk-
Castle Stove Co., 4 B. T. A. 114 (1926).
8 A tort claim against the taxpayer does not constitute "indebtedness"
until reduced to judgment. Appeal of Joseph W. Bettendorf, 3 B. T. A. 378
(1926).
Interest paid by the taxpayer on indebtedness of another is not deductible,
since the taxpayer has a claim against the principal debtor for reimburse-
ment. P. P. Griffin v. Commissioner, 7 B. T. A. 1094 (1927) (endorser of
note paid interest -due thereon); Appeal of Farmers & Traders Bank, 4
B. T. A. 753 (1926) (owner of 37/90 of equity in land, legal title to which
was in another, provided legal owner with funds to pay interest on mort-
gage); Continental Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 7 B. T. A. 539 (1927).
But cf. with last case cited, Overland Knight Co. v. Commissioner, 15 B.
T. A. 870 (1929). The principal debtor can not deduct as interest the
amount repaid to the one paying the interest in the year in which reim-
bursement is made. William D. Hutchins v. Commissioner, 14 B. T. A. 421
(1928). Taxes assessed to meet interest on bonded indebtedness of a local
improvement district are not deductible as interest by the person against
whom they are assessed. F. A. Smith & Wife v. Commissioner, 11 B. T. A.
301 (1928); C. N. Comstock v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 769 (1929).
Where an agreement to pay interest is unsupported by consideration,
interest paid is not deductible. Miller Safe Co. v. Commissioner, 12 B. T. R.
1388 (1928); Simon Benson v. Commissioner, 9 B. T. A. 279 (1927) (inter-
est-boaring note executed as a gift) ; A. Backus Jr. & Sons v. Commissioner,
6 B. T. A. 590 (1927); Appeal of Ohio Valley Tie Co., 3 B. T. A. 339
(1926); Drayton Mills v. Commissioner, 19 B. T. A.-(1930) (interest on
deferred dividends on preferred stock prior to date of declaration).
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debtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry obliga-
tions or securities . . . the interest upon which is vholly
exempt from taxation under this title." 1 The Congress has quite
wisely made no attempt to define the meaning of this section,
leaving that task entirely to federal administrative and judicial
bodies. In dealing with many of the situations which have arisen
these bodies have been required to choose, as the basis for deci-
sion, between the form which the transaction has taken and the
substance of the facts, which may not be truly reflected in the
form. In most instances the tribunal passing upon the case has,
after professing not to be governed by form, actually allowed
itself to be controlled almost entirely by the shape in which the
parties have molded their agreement to pay interest, regardless
of the unreasonableness of the result obtained. Some recent cases,
especially in tl~e Circuit Courts of Appeals, have been decided in
complete disregard of the form adopted, but in the main reliance
still seems to be entirely upon this factor. Two distinct factual
set-ups will be discussed as illustrative.
The first involves the situation where a taxpayer purchases an
article, contracting to pay therefor in installments or in a lump
4 This exception has been held not to apply to indebtedness incurred by a
corporation to purchase stock in a domestic corporation, although dividends
on the stock are not taxable to the holder. Appeal of Greenville Textile
Supply Co., 1 B. T. A. 152 (1924). It does apply to interest paid on bonds
of joint-stock land banks organized under the Federal Farm Loan Act of
1916, the proceeds of which bonds are used to make interest bearing loans
to farmers, the interest on such loans being tax-exempt. First National
Bank of Chicago v. United States, [1930] 3 C. C. H. 8407 (Ct. CL). As
applied to the interest paid by a dealer in municipal bonds on indebtednes
incurred in order to purchase such bonds, it has been held unconstitutional.
Nauts v. Slayton, 36 F. (2d) 145 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929); (1930) 43 HAnv. L.
REv. 969. Gontra: Appeal of Paul P. Prudden, 2 B. T. A. 14 (1925).
5 45 STAT. 799 (1928), 26 U. S. C. § 2023 (b) (1928). This Is the present
wording of the statute and the cases herein considered have all arisen under
essentially similar provisions. Cases under the Corporation Tax Law of
1909, dealing with the limitation of the interest deduction to the amount
of the paid-up capital stock, are not discussed since such limitation no
longer exists.
With reference to the instant statute, the following provisions are con-
tained, inter alia, in T. D. Reg. 74, art. 141: Interest paid by the taxpayer
on a mortgage upon real estate of which he is the legal or equitable owner,
even though he is not directly liable upon the bond or note secured by such
mortgage, may be deducted as interest on his indebtedness. [But cf. Appeal
of Farmers & Traders Bank, supra note 3]. Interest paid by a corporation
on scrip dividends is deductible. Interest calculated for costkeeping or other
purposes on account of capital or surplus invested in the business which
does not represent a charge arising under an interest bearing obligation is
not deductible. [Cf. Ella Daly King v. Commissioner, 10 B. T. A. 698
(1928), where interest paid by a partnership to the partners on their cap-




sum at a future date, the total price to be paid being in excess of
the cash purchase price. May he deduct from his gross income
this excess over the cash price on the ground that it represents
interest? The Board of Tax Appeals has declared that he may
if he can sustain the burden of proving that the parties to the
contract intended that a definite portion of the payments should
constitute interest." Apparently, however, this declaration is of
little aid to the taxpayer unless specific mention of interest has
been made in the contract, for it has been held that such burden
of proof is not sustained by showing that the deferred price
exceeded the cash price and that the vendee had the option of
paying before the due date any balance remaining less a discount
thereon at a specified rate for the unexpired term; ' and more
recently the Board has stated flatly that ". . . where sales are
made on the deferred payment plan, interest not Ieing provided
for in the contract of sale, no part of the deferred payments will
be considered as interest." 8 In the common case where the credit
price is computed by adding to the cash price an amount equiva-
lent to a higher rate of interest than would be allowed under the
usury laws the purchaser will be unable to incorporate a refer-
ence to interest in the contract, since the vendor will be unwilling
to have it appear that the excess is regarded as interest for fear
of running afoul of the defense of usury.? Thus the purchaser
on credit will, through the medium of the income tax, be sub-
jected to an additional expense by the very usury laws which
were designed to protect him.
In these cases the theory of the Board has been that the excess
over the cash price represents compensation for the risk of non-
payment plus payment for the use of money, and that only the
latter amount constitutes interest.10 Proof by the taxpayer of the
exact sum paid as interest in this sense is demanded and such
proof is regarded as impossible unless provision has been made
in the contract of sale. Such a theory is certainly inconsistent
with allowing the maker of a note bearing six per cent. interest
to deduct the entire six per cent.,1 for such interest also repre-
'See Appeal of Marsh & Marsh, Inc., 5 B. T. A. 902, 904 (1926).
7 Appeal of Marsh & Marsh, Inc., supra note 6; Appeal of Carl Lang, 3
B. T. A. 417 (1926); cf. Robert Long v. Commissioner, 5 B. T. A. 438
(1926); Appeal of Anderson & Co., 6 B. T. A. 713 (1927).
s Daniel Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 7 B. T. A. 1086 (1927), aff'd, Daniel
Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 28 F. (2d) 761 (C. C. A. 5th, 1928).
1 Where an article is sold on credit for an amount which exceeds the cash
price by more than the amount of interest on the cash price allowable under
the usury law, nevertheless the defense of usury will usually be held un-
available to the purchaser if no specific mention of interest at a usurious
rate is made in the contract. Comment (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 408.
'See Appeal of Marsh & Marsh, Inc., supra note 6, at 905.




sents payment for the use of money plus compensation for the
risk of non-payment of the principal. The theory which the Board
has adopted, however, has been upheld by one court:
"There would be an obvious lack of plausibility in a contention
that in the case of any contract of sale under which the agreed
price is payable not when the sale takes effect but thereafter,
the buyer's compliance with his obligation to pay the agreed
price involves the payment of interest. [This] would amount
to saying that every credit purchase . . . . gives rise to a
right to a deduction for interest paid or accrued, on the theory
that the credit price includes what the cash price would have
been plus interest on the amount of the cash price." 1
It is submitted that the amount by which the credit price ex-
ceeds the cash price is as much interest in the case where the
credit price is stated in one amount in the contract of sale as it
is in the case where it is stated in two amounts, one of which is
designated as interest. In the former case, perhaps, any attempt
to prove the cash price should be scrutinized carefully to prevent
avoidance of the tax, but where the cash price has been dearly
proved, the doctrine that in the interpretation of tax statutes any
doubt must be construed "most strongly against the government
and in favor of the citizen," 13 should lead to a construction of
the Revenue Act to allow the deduction of the excess of the credit
over the cash price.14 Indeed, the Board of Tax Appeals has
recently allowed the deduction of a portion of annual sums paid
for the purchase of land, where the only distinction from former
cases lay in the fact that the payments were to be made for an
indefinite period (the life of the vendor), rather than for a defi-
nite length of time. While it was this difference which influenced
nine members of the Board (seven dissented) to reach an oppo-
site result from that of former cases,13 such a distinction seems
tenuous at best.
-12 Daniel Bros. v. Commissioner, supra note 8, 28 F. (2d) at 762.
23 See Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 153, 38 Sup. Ct. 53 (1917).
14 Given the cash price, the amount of the installments, and the length of
time in which payment is to be made, the rate of interest to be deducted
a
each year may be computed by the use of the formula P=--+
1+r
. . . . . where P = cash price, a = amount of each
installment, n = the number of years, and r = rate of interest For exam-
ple, assume the cash price to be $100 and the credit terms to be $200 pay-
10D 100
able in two equal annual installments. Then 100 = + -- and1+r (l+r),
r = .62. The deduction for interest would be $62 the first year and $38
the second (i.e. 62% of the portion of the principal remaining unpaid).
25 John C. Moore Corp. v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 1140 (1929). "If we
regard the annuity payments here in question as deferred payments of the
purchase price, there is no fixed cost until the annuitant dies, and insoluble
19203 1029
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A second situation, in which, at least from an administrative
point of view, it may be more justifiable to rely on the form of
the transaction, arises when an incorporated taxpayer attempts
to deduct so-called dividend payments on securities created by it.
Where the incidents of such securities are of a peculiar nature it
becomes extremely difficult to determine whether payments there-
on are in the nature of dividends on shares of stock or interest on
indebtedness. The fact that one corporate creditor may be pre-
ferred over another is scarcely sufficient to justify a refusal to
allow the debtor a deduction for interest paid the junior creditor,
yet the difference between debenture bonds, interest on which
is deductible,1 6 and some types of preferred shares, amounts to
little more than this.
For instance, a corporation creates a security which it desig-
nates "preferred stock," having the following incidents: cumu-
lative dividends at a fixed rate are to be paid out of "surplus" or
"net profits"; the shares are preferred, but limited, as to divi-
dends and distribution of assets both over existing classes of
shares and any classes which may subsequently be created; the
holders are not entitled to vote; severe restrictions are placed on
the corporation with respect to incurrinj unsecured indebtedness
and it is forbidden to mortgage its property while the "preferred
stock" is outstanding; and the claims of the holders are made
subordinate to those of creditors." In addition, it may be pro-
vided that the "shares" must be redeemed at par on a certain
date, and that on failure to pay the dividends or to redeem the
holder may, at his option, require liquidatiofi and receive pay-
ment out of the .assets.5 The security may even be designated
difficulties appear in the application of the tax law to any transaction
which necessitates the fixing of such cost prior to such death." Ibid. 1143.
The Board assumed an interest rate of 6 per cent. and allowed a deduction
of the excess of each annual payment over the present value of such pay-
ment at the time the contract was made.
16 Appeal of New Orleans, Texas & Mex. Ry., 6 B. T. A. 436 (1927).
17 William Cluff Co. v. Commissioner, 7 B. T. A. 662 (1927). The cor-
poration, while the "preferred stock" was outstanding, was forbidden to
create any unsecured indebtedness of more than one year, was required to
maintain an excess of current assets over current liabilities equal in amount
to 150% of the "preferred stock",* and was required to establish, and pay
specified annual sums into, a sinking fund for the redemption of the "pre-
ferred stock."
us Appeal of Leasehold Realty Co., 3 B. T. A. 1129 (1926). Cf. Para-
mount Knitting Mills v. Commissioner, 17 B. T. A. 91 (1929). There a
creditor of the taxpayer corporation held a note bearing interest at 6 per
cent. Upon his demand for a 2 per cent. increase in the interest rate the
corporation issued to him 8 per cent. preferred stock, having a par value
equal to the face value of the note. The creditor was allowed to retain
the note and had the right, upon returning the shares, to *demand cash
payment of the note at any time. It was agreed that all dividends up to
6 per cent. on the shares should be treated as interest on the note. The
[Vol. 891030
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"debenture stock." '9 Should a so-called "debenture bond" be
given these incidents the Board of Tax Appeals would undoubt-
edly allow the corporation to deduct interest thereon, - 1 but where
such words as "stock," "dividends," "shares of preferred stock,"
etc. have been used the deduction has been disallowed on the
ground that payments made constituted "dividends," not "inter-
est on indebtedness." "To be sure [said tie Board] the holders
of this class of stock are preferred in such a manner that they
are almost certain to have their stock redeemed," 2 yet this was
considered insufficient to raise the securities to the plane of rep-
resenting money borrowed, as distinguished from an "investment
-which is risked in the enterprise." 2
In these cases the Board is faced with the necessity of differ-
entiating between interest on indebtedness and dividends on
shares. Both shareholder and creditor in fact are investing in
the enterprise and each expects repayment of his money plus
an additional sum as compensation for furnishing the money.
The distinction between them is one of degree only; there is
probably no one incident or group of incidents which is exclu-
sively typical of either. Some types of securities may have such
a preponderance of incidents usually possessed by one class that
decision thereon will not be difficult, - but when the Board is
Board held payments up to 6 per cent. deductible as interest. Cf. Overland
Knight Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 3. If the note is exchanged for the
shares, however, and the shares are surrendered upon repayment of the
amount of the loan, dividends paid on the shares vhile outstanding are
not deductible by the corporation. Appeal of Dickey Grocery Co., 1 B.
T. A. 108 (1924).
19 Appeal of Kentucky River Coal Corp., 3 B. T. A. 644 (1926).
20 Cf. Appeal of New Orleans, Texas & Mex. Ry., supra note 16.
21 William Cluff Co. v. Commissioner, supr 'note 17, at 668.
22 The Board has attempted to differentiate between dividends and inter-
est in the following language: "Ordinarily. interest is compensation for the
use of money borrowed, while dividends represent that part of the earnings
paid to the stockholder on his investment which is risked in the enterprise."
Doan Savings & Loan Co. v. Commissioner, 12 B. T. A. 772, 780" (1928).
Obviously, both creditoks and shareholders risk their funds in the enter-
prise; the difference lies only in the degree of risk.
23 The Board has refused to allow co-operative associations to deduct pay-
ments made only out of earnings which were designated by the by-laws as
"interest on paid-up capital stock not exceeding 5% per annum." Equity
Union Creamery & Merc. Ex. v. Commissioner, 9 B. T. A. 413 (1927); Ap-
peal of the Farmers' Cooperative Ass'n, 5 B. T. A. 61 (1926); Appeal of
Trego County Cooperative Ass'n, 6 B. T. A. 1275 (1927); Farmers' Co-
operative Milk Co. v. Commissioner, 9 B. T. A. 696 (1927); Selby Equity
Union Exchange v. Commissioner, 12 B. T. A. 1383 (1928); of. Appeal of
Sacred Heart Cooperative Merc. Co., 2 B. T. A. 24 (1925).
Dividends on stock of a building and loan association, tvhich has failed to
qualify for an exemption from taxation accorded to building and loan as-
sociations because of lack of mutuality in its organization, may not be de-
ducted as interest paid, eyen though the shareholders are entitled to with-
19-A] I0;A
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presented only with the creation of a peculiar security and the
peculiar incidents thereof, in what way can it determine whether
such security represents "indebtedness" or a "share of stock"?
Administrative considerations make it desirable to adopt a rule
which will enable the tax collecting bodies to dispose of cases
with facility; the great number of cases handled by the Board
of Tax Appeals alone is a forcible argument in favor of such a
rule.2 ' In such a situation it seems reasonable to say that the in-
come tax law sets forth its provisions in order that the taxpayer
may make his choice of the form in which he will phrase trans-
actions into which he enters and that he should be bound by his
election. Reliance on the form of the security would greatly
facilitate the decision of each case. Such a rule, designed for the
aid of the tax collecting bodies, should, if possible, not be applied
when its application will enable a taxpayer to make deductions
by the use of a form which on its face is obviously fictitious, yet
the Board has shown some indication of a willingness to apply
the rule even to such an extent.2 5
Where, however, the taxpayer shows that the creation of the
security originated in a loan transaction, the incidents attached
to the security and the manner in which it is worded cease to be
draw at any time, receiving the amount of all credits upon withdrawal, less
any share of the company's loss in excess of the reserve fund. Doan Sav-
ings & Loan Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 22; Guaranty State Savings
& Loan Co. v. Commissioner, 14 B. T. A. 72 (1928). But where such an
association attempted to qualify for the exemption accorded to building and
loan associations by requiring all borrowers to apply for "loan stock" and
make small deposits thereon, the Board, looking lVeyond the form, con-
cluded on the facts that there was no bona fide intention to make such
borrowers shareholders and that the application for stock was merely a
colorable attempt to avoid all income taxation. Having so concluded, it
was held that "dividend" payments on "loan stock" were in reality interest
payments on the deposits made and deduction for such interest was allowed.
Guaranty State Savings & Loan Co. v. Commissioner, supra.
24Since the Board heard its first case on August 19, 1924, and to April 1,
1930, it has by decision or final order disposed of approximately 30,000
cases, exactly 6,000 of them by written decision and upon the merits. Book
Review, Manual to United States Board of Tax Appeals Reports (June
1930) 39 YALE L. J.-.
25 In Johnson Locke Merc. Co. v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 1314 (1929)
the taxpayer had entered into a composition agreement with creditors
whereby it was to pay 45 per cent. of the principal obligation within a speci-
fied time. Such payment, it was agreed, would discharge all liability of the
taxpayer to the creditors involved. The contract provided that all sums
paid should be regarded as interest and not as payments on principal. The
Board declared that all sums paid under such an agreement could be de-
ducted, so long as the deductions did not exceed the total liability of the
taxpayer under the agreement. It is difficult to comprehend how all of the
payments which went to discharge the principal obligation could be con-
sidered as interest, even though the parties had so designated such pay-
ments. Cf. Ella Daly King v. Commissioner, supra note 5.
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the only factors on which decision need be based. If the incidents
and form leave the question as to the nature of the security in
doubt, proof that a credit transaction was for some purpose
obscured in the creation of a hybrid type of security should be
sufficient to resolve the doubt in favor of the taxpayer. Thus
one -wishing to borrow money may, at the instance of the lender,
be forced to incorporate his business and issue to the lender se-
curities having such incidents as those set out above in order to
cover up usurious interest which may be exacted. Even in such
a case the Board of Tax Appeals has refused to look beyond the
form of the transaction and, despite the fact that "dividends"
were payable out of various funds in addition to earnings, has
held that no deduction would be allowed.r On appeal to the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, however, the decision of the Board was
reversed,27 the court saying:
"We therefore conclude that a taxpayer who borrows money
at a usurious rate of interest and who, to conceal the usury, is
compelled to execute a document which does not correctly de-
scribe the relationship of the parties, may, as against the govern-
ment, disclose the true relationship of debtor and creditor. Sums
by it paid as interest, regardless of the name by which it is
called, may be deducted by the taxpayer from its income."
A similar result was reached in the recent case of Wiggin Ter-
inirnls v. United States.2- In 1915 the petitioner, a warehouse
company, determined to establish a fumigating plant in its ware-
house. Application for the necessaxy, funds was made to two
banking houses, Estabrook & Co. and Parkinson & Burr. An
informal oral understanding was reached to the effect that the
bankers were to advance $50,000, to be repaid with interest at
6 per cent., with an additional payment of a lump sum of $50,000,
2G Appeal of Arthur R. Jones Syndicate, 5 B. T. A. 853 (1926). A syndi-
cate formed to buy, sell, and rent land wished to borrow from X, who de-
manded 14 per cent. interest. To avoid the usury laws the syndicate issued
to X its "First preferred shares," redeemable at a certain date. These
were the only shares of this class created. They had no voting power, ex-
cept upon default in redemption, when they would acquire complete voting
power, including power to sell the land. "Dividends" at the rate of 14
per cent. were payable out of rents in excess of expenditures, out of
money borrowed, or out of money furnished by the other shareholders. The
first preferred were subordinate to creditors.
.7Arthur R. Jones Syndicate v. Commissioner, 23 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A.
7th, 1927). In McCoy-Garten Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 14 B. T. A. 853
(1928), a somewhat sirpilar situation was presented and the deduction dis-
allowed. The Jones Syndicate case was distinguished on the ground that
there was no showing that the borrower was compelled to execute a docu-
ment incorrectly describing the relationship of the parties in order to
avoid the usury law.




all to be paid out of the earnings of the fumigating plant. In
pursuance of the informal understanding the bankers made ex-
penditures and entered into contracts for the construction of the
plant. In 1916 the petitioner caused to be incorporated the Ter-
minal Fumigating Co. The bankers then contracted with the
fumigating company to complete the plant, transfer it at cost
to the fumigating company, and procure a lease to said company
of the premises of the warehouse company on which the plant
was located. The fumigating company promised to reimburse
the bankers for all expenses incurred in the construction of the
plant and, in addition, to transfer to them its entire authorized
capital stock. The bankers then entered into a contract with
the warehouse company which provided that the bankers should
.acquire the capital stock of the fumigating company and transfer
it free of charge to the warehouse company when the bankers
had received all advances plus interest, and $25,000 apiece in
dividends on such shares. In 1916 the fumigating company paid
the $50,000 advances with interest, and in 1917 Estabrook & Co.
received $25,000 in dividends. Parkinson & Burr waived their
dividends in 1916 and 1917, as they were privileged under the
contract to do, and in 1918 entered into a new contract with the
warehouse company pursuant to the terms of which they trans-
ferred to the said company the shares held by them in the fumi-
gating company, the warehouse company agreeing to pay Parkin-
son & Burr $25,000 out of one half the dividends on the shares
of the fumigating company. This latter payment was made in
1918 and the warehouse company, filing a consolidated return
with the fumigating company, sought to de'duct it as interest.
The deduction was disallowed, the tax paid under protest, and
suit brought to recover the additional tax. The district court
sustained a demurrer to the petition on the ground that the
form in which the formal transaction had been molded changed
the nature of the payments from interest on a loan to capital
expenditure for the purchase of the shares in the fumigating
company. The Circuit Court of Appeals, however, came to the
conclusion that the transaction was in its inception a loan trans-
action and, looking beyond the form that was adopted in order to
protect the bankers against a: defense of usury as to the $50,000
bonus, reversed the lower court.
In such a case, where the facts clearly show a loan transaction
involving usurious interest, it seems unjustifiably harsh to force
the borrower to submit to an additional tax merely because he
was compelled to deprive himself of the defense of usury in
order to obtain the loan. Clear and convincing proof should be
demanded of a taxpayer who asserts that the form of a trans-
action into which he has entered does not clearly reflect the sub-
stance of the transaction, but when such proof is forthcoming
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it seenis unreasonable to hold that the form is determinative of
the taxpayer's rights.
PROOF OP DAMAGE UNDER THE ANTI-TRUST ACTS
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act 1 was passed "to prevent the
stifling of competition." 9 As a remedy for individuals injured as
a result of the formation of illegal combinations or monopolies,
Section 7 provides for the award of damages three times those
suffered by reason of the illegal restraint The same clause was
made a part of the Clayton Act." In the recent case of Paterson
Parchment Paper Co. v. Story Parchment Co.,5 the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the first circuit was faced with the difficulty of
applying this treble damage clause. The plaintiff sued for dam-
ages alleged to be the result of a monopoly maintained by the
defendants in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The
defendants, with others, controlled the parchment paper market
by means of a price fixing association. The plaintiff, acting upon
the belief that its more efficient machinery would enable it to
produce the product more cheaply, tried to enter the market
by underselling the existing "competitors." The latter concert-
edly lowered their prices, and the plaintiff's business failed. The
plaintiff claimed two items of damages: (a) "loss of profits",
based upon the difference between the prices actually received
from the sale of its goods and the prices existing upon its en-
trance into the field, and (b) the depreciation in the value of its
326 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1926).
2 See Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 454, 462 (C. C. A. 8th,
1903). In U. S. v. Patterson, 201 Fed. 697, 716 (S. D. Ohio 1912), the
court in discussing the purposes of the Sherman Act insisted: "Eminent
authority, beginning with Lord Chief Justice Hale, have declared that the
Christian religion is a part of the law of England . . . It is said by
Justice Brewer . . . that the United States is a Christian nation. No
finding on this question is here made, for it is not necessary; but it may
safely be said that civilization, as we understand it, so far as the recogni-
tion of the individual in the community and his rights are concerned, is
the outgrowth of the appreciation that, among many other things, dealings
between man and man must be on terms of justice, and justice requires
that no man shall build up his business by acts whose purpose is to put
the purchasing public at his mercy or to exploit others to his advantage,
and destroy thereby the opportunities of others to exercise their talents
and desires in the same field of mercantile activity."
"Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any
other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared
to be unlawful by this" act, may sue therefor, . . . and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained. ." 26 STAT. 210 § '7 (1890), 15
U. S. C. § 15 (1926).
4 38 STAT. 731 § 4 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1926).
537 F. (2d) 537 (C. C. A. 1st, 1930). The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari. U. S. Daily, April 15, 1930, at 489.
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plant due to its being forced out of business. The jury in the Dis-
trict Court found that there had been a monopoly in restraint of
trade as a result of which the plaintiff had been injured in its
business, and awarded damages. The Circuit Court of Appeals,
reversing this decision, held that a verdict should have been di-
rected for the defendants because (1) the "loss of profits" was
speculative and conjectural, and (2) the factory depreciation was
not shown to have been caused by the defendants' monopoly. A
dissenting opinion maintained that the definiteness of the proof
of loss of profits and the existence of causal relation between
the depreciation and the restraint were both questions of fact
for the jury which were improperly decided by the court.
To recover under Section 7 of the Sherman Act a plaintiff must
prove that there has been a restraint of trade on the part of the
defendants, that he has suffered an injury in his business and
property, and that the injury sustained was caused by the illegal
acts of the defendants.7 There are thus three different evidential
requirements to be met, failure to meet any of which will effec-
tually block a recovery.8 In the instant case there was no question
of the proof of a restraint of interstate commerce-that was con-
6"Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several states or foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. . . ." 26 STAT. 209 § 2 (1890), 15
U. S. C. § 2 (1926).
7 See the express provisions of the section, supra note 3.
8 Many cases brought under § 7 of the Sherman Act fail to run the pro-
cedural gauntlet, and thus never reach the point of having to meet these
three evidential requirements. A few of the cases deeided on demurrer are:
Binderup v. Pathe Exchange Inc., 263 U. S. 291, 44 Sup. Ct. 96 (1923);
Gibbs v. McNeeley, 102 Fed. 594 (C. C. W. D. Wash. 1900); Wheeler-
Stenzel Co. v. National Window Glass Jobbers' Ass'n, 152 Fed. 864 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1907); Thomsen v. Union Castle Mail S. S. Co., 166 Fed. 251 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1908); Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Co. v. American Sugar Refining
Co., 166 Fed. 254 (C. C. A. 2d, 1908); People's Tobacco Co. v. American
Tobacco Co., 170 Fed. 396 (C. C. A. 5th, 1909); Ware-Kramer v. American
Tobacco Co., 180 Fed. 160 (E. D. N. C. 1910); Hale v. O'Connor Coal &
Supply Co., 181 Fed. 267 (C. C. D. Conn. 1908); Hale v. Hatch & North
Coal Co., 204 Fed. 433 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913); Marienelli v. United Booking
Offices of America, 227 Fed. 165 (S. D. N. Y. 1914); Hood Rubber Co. v.
United States Rubber Co., 229 Fed. 583 (D. Mass. 1916); United Copper
Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 Fed. 574 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916) ;
American Steel Co. v. American Steel & Wire Co., 244 Fed. 300 (D. Mass.
1916) ; Noyes v. Parsons, 245 Fed. 689 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917).
9 In the following cases the plaintiff failed to meet the first of these three
requirements: Virtue v. Creamery Package Co., 227 U. S. 8, 33 Sup. Ct. 202
(1913); Blumenstock Bros. Adv. Agency v. Curtis Pub. Co., 252 U. S. 436,
40 Sup. Ct. 385 (1920) ; Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U. S.
208, 41 Sup. Ct. 451 (1921) ; U. M. W. A. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S.
344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570 (1922); Dueber Watch-Case Co. v. Howard Watch
Co., 66 Fed. 637 (C. C. A. 2d, 1895); Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co.,
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sidered to have been establishedY But in regarding the plaintiff's
loss of profits as speculative and conjectural the court raised the
issue presented by the second requirement. Likewise, though
admitting the depreciation of the plant, the court refused recovery
on the ground that a "measurable" connection had not been estab-
lished betveen the damage and the collusion, thus raising the
issue piesented by the third requirement.
A long line of cases has laid down the rule that damages can-
not be recovered if based solely on "speculation and conjecture"
but must be logically inferrable from facts and expressible in
figures10 To this rule the court adhered in the instant case. But
although the application of this rule to the facts of a given case
is usually left to the jury," the Circuit Court of Appeals here
ordered a directed verdict for the defendants. Were the facts in
this case so clear as to warrant this summary action on the part
of the court?
Normally such action has been taken in cases where, had the
alleged damage actually been suffered, far better proof of it
would have been available than was produced at the trial. Thus
in Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hart-muin,m a retail coal dealer
claimed damages for the refusal of certain wholesale coal dealers
to sell him coal. This inability to secure coal allegedly resulted
in a decrease in the plaintiff's retail sales, but on the trial no
books or accounts were produced to prove such a decrease. The
court held that, in the absence of proof of the actual expenses and
profits of an established business anterior to and during the
period of restraint, any claim of damages based on diminished
profits would be speculative, remote and conjectural. Through-
out the opinion it was intimated that, had the plaintiff been in-
jured as claimed, acceptable evidence not produced at the trial
would have been available to substantiate the claim of injury."
supra note 2; Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 218 Fed. 447 (C. C. A. 2d,
1914); Konecky v. Jewish Press, 288 Fed. 179 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923). For
an exhaustive article on the meaning of "restraint" under § 8 of the Sher-
man Act, see Comment (1929) 38 YALM L. J. 503.
20 Lowry v. Tile, Mantel & Grate Ass'n of California, 106 Fed. 38, 46
(N. D. Cal. 1900); McCornick v. United States Mining Co., 185 Fed. 748,
751 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911); American Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran,
229 Fed. 77, 79 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915).
- Lowry v. Tile, Mantel & Grate Ass'n of California, supra note 10. This
case was later affirmed in 115 Fed. 27 (C. C. A. 9th, 1902) andin 193 U. S.
38, 24 Sup. Ct. 307 (1904).
12 I Fed. 96 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901).
33 Ibid. 102. In McCornick v. United States Mining Co., supra note 10,
the plaintiff claimed damages for the inactivity of a mine cloued by an
injunction issued upon the request of the defendants. The damages esti-
mated were based on an output far in excess of the actual output either
before or after the inactive period. Terming the claim "speculative" be-
cause not substantiated by the company's books showing the real output,
the court refused a recovery. Again the claim seemed fictitious when con-
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The case of Arterican Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran"' pre-
sented a similar situation. The plaintiff was forced to buy slate
at advanced prices due to an illegal sales agreement of the de-
and for the diffcrence between his purchase price and the market
price of slate; butt on the trial the loss of specific customers was
not shown and t-e "market price" turned out to have been com-
puted without reference to the qualities and quantities which the
plaintiff had bought. In the absence of more specific evidence
the court held the loss had not been established and denied
recovery.1 5
An even clearer case against recovery was presented in Jack
v. Armour & Co.1 6 The plaintiff there set out in considerable de-
tail an illegal combination maintained in the meat-dressing and
packing business. He then alleged that he was engaged in the
business of buying and selling hogs and cattle. The petition con-
cluded with the bare statement that he had been injured in his
business in the sum of $25,000 by reason of the monopoly. Since
the plaintiff failed to prove specific injury, the court held that no
cause of action inured to his benefit as a result of the monopoly
merely because he was in the same business with the defend-
ants.17 And in Keogh v. C. & N. W. Ry.,28 upon which the court
in the Patersmon case laid much emphasis, the plaintiff's evidence
of damage was even less satisfactory. There the plaintiff sought
damages based on freight rates charged him by the defendants.
The rates were shown to have been held reasonable by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. In denying the plaintiff's claim
that he was entitled to have his freight shilped at rates set by
competition among the carriers, the court held that "damages"
resulting from a nonexistent, illegal theory of rate-making were
purely speculative. Clearly, having paid rates recognized by the
Commission, the plaintiff had suffered nb damage9
These are the leading cases in which the courts have held the
sidered in the light of the best evidence: the books and accounts of the
going concern.
14 Supra note 10.
15 But see infra notes 20 arid 22.
16 291 Fed. 741 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923).
17 The refusal of the court to recognize such a claim as this is readily
understood. The plaintiff, presumably a dealer who sold to such organiza-
tions as that of the defendants, is seeking to capitalize on the existence of
the conspiracy. But § 7 is not so broad in its terms as to give any rights
to those who have not been specifically injured.
IS 260 U. S. 156, 43 Sup. Ct. 47 (1922).
19 The claim of the plaintiff was obviously ridiculous. The rates had been
held reasonable in proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission
to which the present plaintiff had himself been a party. Were a shipper
forced to pay rates declared excessive by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, however, it is clear that recovery would be granted. See Meeker v.
Lehigh Valley Ry., 162 Fed. 354, 358 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1908).
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evidence of injury too speculative to admit of a recovery. There
are, however, many decisions in which recoveries have been
granted. The simplest case is where a plaintiff alleges and proves
the loss of specific customers due to the illegal activities of the
defendants.2o If he shows loss due to his inability to round out
his stock because of the refusal of the defendants to sell him
goods he may recover for that loss.2 1 If he shows that he was
forced to pay higher prices for goods of the defendants than
others paid, that is a recoverable loss 2 2 If a plaintiff has a going
concern and can show the difference between profits made during
a period of discrimination against him and an earlier period
when he was dealing in a competitive market, he can recover the
difference as anticipated profits.23 Finally, if a plaintiff has been
forced to pay enhanced prices due to a price-fixing combination,
the courts have awarded as damages the difference between the
price paid and "the reasonable price of the commodity under
natural competitive conditions." 21
A study of the cases discussed indicates that "speculation and
conjecture" cannot be categorically defined so that the decisions
will fall automatically into the recovery or the non-recovery
group. The courts must take care lest a conspiracy in restraint
of trade be always followed by a series of fictitious damage suits;
yet an award of damages should be made if an injury has in
fact occurred. The rule laid down and followed should therefore
be elastic enough to permit of application to the many variations
in fact situations.25 The facts of the instant case differ in two
important respects from those in the dases in which the rule had
previously been applied. In the first place, the plaintiff in those
cases had always been a going concern pre-dating the illegal
conspiracy, while the plaintiff in the Patersou case entered the
parchment paper industry after the monopoly was fully organ-
ized. In the second place, the discriminations sued on in the
earlier cases were vertical (mainly refusals to sell goods),
2O Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66, 37 Sup. Ct. 353 (1917).
21 Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 810 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921).
22Lowry v. Tile, Mantel & Orate Ass'n of California, supra note 10;
Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 297 Fed. 791 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924).2 3Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Material Co., 295 Fed. 98 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1923). But the courts refuse the recovery of anticipated profits
based upon past earnings in a non-competitive field. Victor Talking Ma-
chine Co. v. Kemeny, supra note 21; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Blackniore,
277 Fed. 694 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).2 Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works, 127 Fed. 23 (C. C. A.
6th, 1903).
25 It is at once apparent that "speculation and conjecture" has" much in
common with such concepts as "public interest", "due care", or "proximate
cause". Boundless in themselves, their limits must be pricked out by a




whereas in the Pa'. rson case the plaintiff claimed injuries result-
ing from attempt'd horizontal competition with the defendants.
These dissimilaritoes increased materially the difficulty of prov-
ing damages. Since the concern was new, neither the loss of cus-
tomers, nor a decrease in business, nor the record of earlier
profits were available as standards by which to measure dam-
ages. Prices in the open market were likewise unavailable as
a measure of damages, for there had been no open market for
years. Furthermore, as this was not a simple vertical set-up,
damages could not be proved merely by showing a refusal of the
defendants to deal with the plaintiff. Thus all of the standards
used to measure damages in the earlier cases were unavailable
in the case under discussion.
To demand of the plaintiff that he use these standards or none
precluded a recovery.26 The effect of such a holding is to make the
damage clause of the Anti-Trust Acts available as a remedy only
to well established concerns, and not to newcomers in a partic-
ular field. Yet the act was designed to protect the one as well as
the other.27 To accomplish this protection it seems reasonable
that the court should have recognized the new elements peculiar
to the plaintiff's situation and allowed the question of the exist-
ence and amount of damage to go to the jury.23
In addition to the "loss of profits" item the plaintiff sued for
damages caused by the depreciation in the value of his factory.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, vacating the decision of the lower
court in which the jury had awarded damages based partly on
26 Cases such as the Paterson case must of course be distinguished from
a"case such as Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Co. v. American Sugar Re-
fining Co., supra note 8, where the defendants have acquired share control
of a competing organization and have by this means proceeded to under-
mine the welfare of the rival company. No such direct intefference char-
acterizes the case of competing industries carrying on a price war.
2T "i is as unlawful to prevent a person from engaging in business as
it is to drive a person out of business". Thomsen v. Union Castle Mail
S. S. Co., supra note 8, at 253.
28 See Loder v. Jayne, 142 Fed. 1010, 1020 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1906), where
the court announced the test to be whethet or not the plaintiff submitted
"the best evidence he could under the circumstances." See also Straus v.
Victor Talking Machine Co., supra note 15, at 802: "The constant tendency
of the courts is to find some way in which damages can be awarded when
a wrong has been done. Difficulty of ascertainment is no longer confused
with the right of recovery."
The court in the instant case, took the view that it was altogether specu-
lative that the prices existing when the plaintiff entered the market would
have continued had the defendants not illegally changed them. This is
true, but might not that price level still have been used by the jury as a
base from which to reckon the damages, taking into account the factor of
a possible change due to the entrance of a new competitor. As the dissent-
ing opinion maintains, this would be no more specdtidtive than assessing
the damages for a lost limb, or in many a trademark and patent case.
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this depreciation, insisted that the plaintiff's failure was obvi-
ously "inevitable either from lack of capital or inefficient manage-
ment or both," and that the plaintiff had failed to prove "that
the subsequent depreciation was due in any measurable degree
to any violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act"
In cases of vertical restraint where the defendants injure the
plaintiff by refusing to deal with him, the causal relation between
the illegal restraint and the damage is obvious. But in the case
of units competing on the same level, such causal relation is far
more difficult to prove. Since each single unit of industry is
merged in the entire industrial system with its numerous inter-
relationships and interdependencies, it is impossible to trace
clearly the influence of a particular factor upon the welfare of
any particular unit. Therefore, to seek a self-sufficient sequence
from the operation of any particular factor on a unit, as did the
court in the Paterson case, is to ignore other factors which have
an inescapable bearing on that sequence. And if it is desired
to reduce to terms of cause and effect the influence of a particular
factor on the welfare of a particular industrial unit, much must
necessarily be left to inference. It is here that the jury is im-
portant to make a finding of "fact." In the instant case, the de-
fendants conspired to drive the plaintiff out of business. Busi-
ness failure followed in the course of a few months. That the
conspiracy was a moving factor in bringing about this failure
seems at least a fair assumption. The court, in refusing to let
the question of causation go to the jury, did not indicate what
evidence would have been acceptable, or available, to establish
the conspiracy as a "measurable" cause of the failureY If the
situation is such that evidence of a direct interference could be
produced, then the maximum of available evidence should be re-
quired. But if, as in the present case, the situation is such that
inferential evidence alone can exist, the plaintiff should not be
penalized because of the complexity of the industrial system in
which he is seeking to set up shop. 0
In its holdings on both points the court in the Paterson case
seems to have gone Well beyond the decisions on which it relies.8 '
29 The court held~lack of capital to have been a cause of the plaintiff's
failure. Even assuming this, without the conspiracy on the part of the
defendants the failure would not have occurrid so soon. Had the plaintiffs
been allowed to make a better showing at the start of their enterpriEe, ad-
ditional outside capital might have been attracted. Furthermore, even
assuming the plaintiff's failure to have been eventually inevitable, should
this arbitrary illegal interference of the defendants on that account be
condobed?
30See Loder v. Jayne, supra note 28.
31 Compare the facts in the instant case with those in the Jack case,




If the case becomes recognized as a valid extension of the eviden-
tial requirements laid down in earlier cases, it will clearly lead
to a further emasculation of the already weakened Anti-Trust
Acts.3 2 Though scarcely in accord with the express philosophy
underlying the acts that "competition is the life of trade," 11
such a policy may well be consistent with the trend of economic
development. The transition from petty trade to great industry
is bringing in its wake an increasing skepticism of the benef-
icence of competition and an increasing tolerance of regulated
monopoly.8'
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
The Clayton Act,1 passed by Congress in 1914, was officially
labelled an attempt to supplement the Sherman Anti-trust Law
of 1890.2 This end was to be accomplished by specifically prohib-
iting certain trade practices not defined in the Sherman Law,
and by arresting "the creation of trusts, conspiracies and mo-
nopolies in their incipiency and before consummation." s Yet the
history of the Act in the courts seems to support certain criti-
cism levelled at it, shortly after its passage, for its apparent
failure to add anything new to the Sherman Law or even to facil-
itate the accomplishment of similar ends.' More specifically,
partly as a result of its inherently limited scope and partly as a
32 See the statement of the court in Konecky v. Jewish Press, supra note
9, at 182.
33 Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co.,
supra note 8, at 260.
1, The problem of liability is complicated by the difficulty of fixing a
causal relation. The problem of reducing damage to pecuniary terma Is
likewise exceedingly complex. It is a question too broad to be discussed in
this comment whether the existing machinery of judge and jury lends
itself to a satisfactory determination of these two problems.
In seeking to fix "reasonable prices" the courts are faced with the same
difficulty. In this connection, in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
273 U. S. 392, 398, 47 Sup. Ct. 377, 379 (1927), Mr. Justice Stone declared:
" .. .We would hesitate to adopt a constraction making the difference
between legal and illegal conduct in the field of business relation depend
upon so uncertain a test as whether prices are reasonable-a determination
which can be satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of our
economic organization and a choice between rival philosophies."
1 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §§ 12-27 (1926), entitled "An Act to
supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and
for other purposes."
226 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (1926).
3 Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Clayton Act: See
Swift & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 8 F. (2d) 595, 597 (C. C. A.
7th, 1925).
4 Levy, The Clayton Law (1916) 3 VA. L. REv. 411, 417; Stevens, The
Clayton Act (1915) 5 AM. ECON. REv. 38.
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result of cautious judicial application, Section 7 ' of the Act, for-
bidding intercorporate shareholding where the effect thereof
may be "to substantially lessen competition" or "to tend to create
a monopoly", has contributed little to pre-existing legislation.0
At the outset, the Sherman Law, declaring illegal "every con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce," I by the very
breadth of its language, had already included the particular
method of consolidation covered by Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. Under the earlier Law several combinations formed by in-
tercorporate shareholding had been dissolved by the Supreme
Court before the later Act was passed.8 Additional legislation,
therefore, except in so far as it provided for catching such com-
binations in their incipiency, would have seemed unnecessary.
The seeming inadequacy of the section to cope with corporate
methods of merger was made apparent at an early date. The
Federal Trade Commission, given concurrent jurisdiction under
the Act with the Federal Courts," shortly held that the acquisition
of physical assets could not be prohibited, even though the result
thereof was to lessen competition.10 Consequently, where stock
was acquired immediately prior to an outright purchase of prop-
erty, an order from the Commission requiring divestment of such
stock would obviously prove an empty ceremony. In a case in-
volving'this situation, the Court held that the Commission had
no power to order a divestment of property as well as stoc. 1 Yet
"No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indi-
rectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition
may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whoze
stock is so acquired and the -corporation making the acquisition, or to re-
strain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a
monopoly of any line of commerce." The section does not apply "to cor-
porations purchasing such stock solely for investment" nor prohibit them
from owning the stock of subsidiary corporations.
6 See Stevens, op. cit. supra note 4, at 43.
7 Supra note 2, at 209, 15 U. S. C. § 1.
8 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 24 Sup. Ct.
436 (1904); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct.
502 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 31
Sup. Ct. 632 (1911).
9 The Clayton Act, supra note 1, at 734, 736, 15 U. S. C. §§ 21, 25.
1 oConference Ruling, 1 Fed. Trade Com. Dec. 541 (1916). In the follow-
ing cases, the section was directly violated and a divestment of the stock
acquired ordered: United States v. New England Fish Exchange,.258 Fed.
732 (D. Mass. 1919); Federal Trade Commission v. Armour & Co., 4 Fed.
Trade Com. Dec. 457 (1922); Aluminum Co. of America v. Federal Trade
Commission, 284 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922), certiorari denied, 261 U. S.
616, 43 Sup. Ct. 362 (1923); Federal Trade Commission v. Western Meat
Co., 272 U. S. 554, 47 Sup. Ct. 175 (1926).
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in an opinion rendered simultaneously, where the defendant had
acquired physical assets after the institution of proceedings to
order divestment of stock, the Supreme Court, noting the clear
attempt to evade the Act, sustained the Commission's inclusion
of physical property in the divestment order.22 The absurdity
of determining the scope of remedial power according to whether
the property was acquired before or after the institution of the
remedial action is pointed out in Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent
to the holding in the former case. The fallacy of assuming Sec-
tion 7 to be inherently limited to stock acquisition is indicated
by the Court's decision in the latter case.
The mere inclusion of the word "substantially" limits still
further the applicability of the Section. If there is no substan-
tial competition between two companies, acquisition by one of
the capital stock of the other can scarcely tend "to substantially
lessen" competition in the broad sense in which the word is used
in the Act.13 Where, however, there exists some such competi-
tion, the question arises as to how much must exist before the
section will apply. Since Court and Commission exercise con-
current jurisdiction, it would seem particularly advisable, from
the standpoint of effective enforcement, that both apply the same
test.
The confusion arising from a failure to observe so elementary
a requirement is apparent in the recent case of FederaZ Trade
Commission v. Ihternationa Shoe Co0 4 There the Commission
concluded from the facts that substantial competition had existed
betweefi the defendant and another large shoe company, and
hence that the acquisition of all the capital stock of the latter
tended "to substantially lessen competition ."2, From the very
same facts the Supreme Court drew the conclusion that there had
been no substantial competition between the two, and conse-
quently that the purchase could not violate the Act. It is signifi-
cant that the Commission applied a quantitative test, giving an
exact and scientific interpretation to the word "substantial,"
11 Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, Swift & Co. v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 272 U. S. 554, 47 Sup. Ct. 175 (1926), rev'g 5 F.
(2d) 615 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925) and 8 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925); see
Note (1926) 26 COL. L. REv. 594; Note (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 463.
12 Federal Trade Commission v. Western Meat Co., supra note 10.
23 Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union, 246 Fed. 851 (S. D.
Ohio 1917); In the Matter of Austin, Nichols & Co., 9 Fed. Trade Com.
Dec. 170 (1925); Merger of Certain Steel Companies, 33 Op. Att'y Gen.
225 (1922).
14 50 Sup. Ct. 89 (1930). Justices Stone, Holmes and Brandeis dissented.
For facts of the case see infra note 18. See Note (1930) 24 ILL. L. REv.
908.
15 In the Matter of International Shoe Co., 9 Fed. Trade Com. Dec. 441
(1925) (two commissi-mers dissenting), aff'd, 29 F. (2d) 518 (C. C. A. 1st,
1928). See Comment (1929) 27 MICH. L. REv. 931.
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whereas the Supreme Court held that "the standard of legality
was the absence or presence of prejudice to the public interest
by unduly restricting competition or unduly restraining the
course of trade." 26
The test applied by the Commission is based primarily upon a
consideration of the relative size of various factors." The facts
are first analysed to determine (1) the products manufactured
in common by the two companies; (2) the proportion of -these
competing products (a) to the total annual output in the United
States, (b) to the total annual output of the two companies; (3)
the type of trade, whether wholesale or retail; (4) the localities
in which the competing goods are sold. 3 After this analysis has
been made the problem becomes one of degree, but it is a degree
easily reducible to terms of percentage, the solution of the prob-
lem hinging on whether or not a certain ratio falls within a pre-
cise mathematical definition of the word "substantially." In
sharp contrast to this scientific approach to the problem is the
method adopted by the Supreme Court. In place of what seems
to be a sufficiently accurate, if arbitrary, test within the terms
of the Section, it has substituted the criterion of "public interest."
Authority for using such a test has been found in certain de-
cisions of the court under the Sherman Law where the "rule
of reason" has of late been rather consistently applied. 0 Here
16 50 Sup. Ct. at 91. (Italics ours).
"This is the method used by the Attorney General in his report to the
Senate on the proposed merger of the Bethlehem Steel and other companies,
supra note 13.
Is The International Shoe Co. and the McElwain Co. both sold similar
lines of shoes. In 1921 the latter concern fell into financial difficulties and
proposed a merger with the International Co. The proposition va con-
sidered and subsequently adopted, the International Co. buying up all the
McElwain Co.s capital stock, but leaving the management and organiza-
tion of the latter concern intact. In 1923 the Federal Trade Commission
issued its complaint charging a violation of § 7.
The Commission made the following findings: (1) both companies
manufactured and sold men's dress shoes "similar in style and comparable
in price"; (2) the International Co. was the largest manufacturer of
leather shoes in the United States and the McElwain Co. the largest
Manufacturer of mens' dress shoes; (3) both companies sold to retailers;
but (4) 95% of the International Co.'s sales were in the rural districts
of the West and South and 95% of the McElwain Co.'s in the large cities
of the East. On the other hand there was evidence of close competition in
Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee and Texas.
19 The "rule of reason" was first enunciated by Chief Justice White in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra note 8, and followed in United
States v. American Tobacco Co., .upra note 8; Nash v. United States, 229
U. S. 373, 33 Sup. Ct. '780 (1913); Eastern Lumber Ass'n v. United States,
234 U. S. 600, 34 Sup. Ct. 951 (1914); Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U. S. 231, 38 Sup. Ct. 242 (1918); United States v. Keystone
Watch Co., 218 Fed. 502 (E. D. Pa. 1915); United States v. Prince Line,
220 Fed. 230 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); American Press Ass'n v. United States,
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"the essence of the law is injury to the public. It is not every
restraint of competition and not every restraint of trade that
works an injury to the public; it is only an undue and unreason-
able restraint of trade that has such an effect and is deemed un-
lawful." 20 Under the Sherman Law, which embodies the general
terms of the common law, such a test may have been necessary
and even otherwise justifiable. Yet after its first enunciation
there was some sentiment to the effect that the court was saying,
"There are good trusts and bad trusts, and we have the power
to say what are the good trusts and what are the bad trusts,
according to our economic and political views." 21 Even within
the court itself there has been a division of opinion over the
rule and it is by no means universally applied.2
245 Fed. 91 (C. C. A. 7th, 1917); McLatchy v. King, 250 Fed. 920 (D.
Mass. 1917); Fosburgh v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Co., 291 Fed.
29 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); United States v. Fur Dressers' and Fur Dyers'
ASs'n, 5 F. (2d) 869 (S. D. N. Y. 1925); cf. Lee Line Steamers v. Mem-
phis Packet Co., 277 Fed. 5 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922) (holding that when a
monopoly is complete no question can arise as to its reasonableness).
20 United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U. S. 392, 395, 47 Sup. Ct.
377, 379 (1925). This was the charge the defendant company requested the
court to give to the jury. Refusal to submit the question of reasonableness
was brought as error to the Supreme Court where the conviction was upheld
on the ground the "rule of reason" was not to be applied to cases involving
price-fixing agreements.
As stated by Chief Justice White: " .... it was intended that the
standard of reason which had applied at the common law and in this
country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by the statute,
was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whe-
iher in a given case a particular act had or had not brought about the
wrong against which the statute provided." Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, supra note 8, at 60, 31 Sup. Ct. at 516.
21 TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT (1914) 114.
By inserting into the Act the word "undue", so as to negative the pro-
hibition of every restraint of trade, the court has made "Congress say what
it did not say, what, as I think, it plainly did not intend to say and what,
since the passage of the act, it has explicitly refused to say . . . In
short, the court now, by judicial legislation in effect amends an act of
Congress relating to a subject over which that department of the govern-
ment has exclusive cognizance." Dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan,
United States v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 8, at 192, 31 Sup. Ct. at
652. That the rule "can never serve other than rhetorical ends" see
KEEZER & MAY, THE PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1930) 83. See also
Pope, Legal Aspects of Monopoly (1907) 20 HARv. L. REv. 167, 178; Wat-
hins, Change in Trust Policy (1922) 35 HARV. L. REv. 815.
22 It is generally recognized that price fixing agreements are in them-
selves unreasonable, particularly in the case of common carriers, so that
the rule as to them is inapplicable. United States v. Trans-Missouri
F'reight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290, 17 Sup. Ct. 540 (1897); United States v.
Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505, 19 Sup. Ct. 25 (1898); Addyston Pipe
Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 20 Sup. Ct. 96 (1899); Bement v.
National Hariow Co., 186 U. S. 70, 22 Sup. Ct. 747 (1902); Chesapeake
Fuel Co v. United States, 115 Fed. 610 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902); Thomsen v.
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It is clear that the adoption of the rule of reason under the
older act had its effect on the legislation of 1914. -23 Certain prac-
tices were specifically prohibited, and an attempt was made to
define accurately what was illegal and what was not.- ' Although
a lower federal court on one occasion read the rule of reason
into the Clayton Law25 the Supreme Court at the time insisted
that "the words being clear, they are decisive", and that resort
should not be had to extraneous standards.20 Later, in Surift &
Cayser, 243 U. S. 66, 37 Sup. Ct. 353 (1917) ; Keogh v. C. & N. W. R. R.,
260 U. S. 156, 43 Sup. Ct. 47 (1922); United States v. Trenton Potterie3
Co., supra note 20. For comment on the confusion in the decisions under
the Sherman law see Bledsoe, D. J.: "I confess that you can read certain
decisions emanating from the most exalted tribunal in the world, respecting
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and then you can read other decisions emanat-
ing from the same tribunal, and if you are only human you may be held
to assert that they do not always seem to be consistent one with another."
Continental Candy Corp. v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Co., 270
Fed. 302, 304 (N. D. Cal. 1920).
23 The National Platform of the Democratic Party adopted at the Balti-
more Convention in 1912 said: "We regret that the Sherman Anti-Trust
Law has received a judicial construction depriving it of much of its ei-
ciency, and we favor the enactment of legislation which will restore to
the statute the strength of which it has been deprived by such interpreta-
tions."21President Wilson in his message to Congress on Jan. 20, 1914 caid:
"The business of the country awaits also, has long awaited and has suf-
fered because it could not obtain, further and more explicit legislative
definition of the policy and meaning of the existing anti-trust law . . .
surely we are sufficiently familiar with the-actual proee-ss and methods
of monopoly and of many hurtful restraints of trade to make definition
possible, at any rate up to the limits of what experience has dicclozed.
These practices, being now abundantly disclosed, can ba explicitly and
item by item forbidden by statute in such terms as will practically elimin-
ate uncertainty, the law itself and the penalty being made equally plain."
See* also HEMDSON, THE FRnaAL T=A. CorAis0soN (1924) 15-26;
Kza& MAY, op. cit. =upra note 21, at 20-26.25 Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 282 Fed. 81 (C. C. A.
3d, 1922). The court said in applying the rule to § 3, which pro-
hibits tying agreements, ". .. . in determining whether given acts
amount to unfair methods of competition within the meaning of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, or substantially lessen competition and tend
to create a monopoly within the meaning of the Clayton Act, the only
standard of legality with which we are acquainted is the standard estab-
lished by the Sherman Act . . . and by the courts in construing the
Sherman Act with reference to acts 'which operate to the prejudice of the
public interest by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing
the due course of trade." 282 Fed. at 87.
2"There is nothing. to construe. To search elsewhere for a meaning
either beyond or short of that which they disclose is to invite the danger,
in the one case, of converting what was meant to be open and precise, into
a concealed trap for the unsuspecting, or, in the other, of relieving from
the grasp of the statute some whom the Legislature definitely meant to
include." Sutherland, J., in George Van Camp & Sons v. American Can
Co., 278 U. S. 245, 253, 49 Sup. Ct. 112, 113 (1929) (involving § 2 of the
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Co. v. United States, 7 the Court specifically rejected the rule as
applied to Section 7. The same attitude was also adopted in cases
arising under similarly worded sections of the Act, the Court
sayinf, in United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States: 2 8 "The
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act provide different tests of
liability . . . the Clayton Act was intended to supplement the
Sherman Act, and within its limited sphere established its own
rule." 29
In the light of such considerations, the reasoning of the Court
in the International Shoe Co. case seems peculiarly out of place.
Had Congress intended to inject the standard of "reason" and
"public interest" into the Clayton Act, the rule, so recently enun-
ciated, could easily have been incorporated in express words.
No procedural justification exists for applying a test, rendered
necessary by the general terms of the Sherman Law, to supple-
mental legislation providing its own rather definite standards.
And such a practice seems particularly ill-advised when it creates
a conflict of standards between the Supreme Court and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission in the enforcement of one section of the
Act, whereby the effective scope of that Section is automatically
reduced to the small group of cases in which the two tests coin-
cide in outlawing the industrial combination under investigation.
There are even further hazards to effective enforcement in
the very vagueness of such a criterion as the "rule of reason." 80
While the interpretation of the anti-trust laws, by their nature
so general that what they aim to prevent can not be precisely de-
fined, can never be rendered so stereotyped as'entirely to exclude
the political and economic preferences of judges, yet a frank
judicial adoption of a "rule of reason" paves the way for much
greater predominance of such preferences in the decisions. One
assumption made in the International Shoe Co. case illustrates
the sort of danger inherent in such a flexible test. When the In-
ternational company purchased the stock of its competitor, the
latter was in severe financial straits and there was a possibility
that it might fail although the Commission, after a careful anal-
ysis, found that it was not insolvent. 31 With only these facts be-
Clayton Act). See also Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co.,
258 U. S. 346, 356, 42 Sup. Ct. 360, 362 (1922); United Shoe Machinery
Corp. v. United States, 258 U. S. 451, 459, 42 Sup. Ct. 363, 366 (1922) (§ 3
of the Clayton Act).
27 8 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925).
28 Snjirui note 26.
20 258 U. S. at 459, 42 Sup. Ct. at 366.
-31 See -Sutherland J., supra note 26.
31 "The pioperty of W. H. McElwain Company at value shown in the
balance sheet of April 30, 1921 (the contract of purchase was made on May
11), exceeded its- debts approximately $10,000,000." On May 31 (after the
purchase) the value of the property in excess of the company's debts was
over $8,000,000 and on November 30 over $3,000,000. Supra note 15, at 454.
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fore it, the Court definitely assumed that the company would
have failed had no purchaser rescued it, by stating that the pur-
chase could not possibly tend to lessen competition, since the
only alternative was failure and a resultant cessation of competi-
tion. Under such circumstances, agreed six members of the
Court, "we hold that the purchase of its capital stock . . . is
not in contemplation of law prejudicial to the public." 82 Even
could it have been proved that the company would have failed,
the Clayton Act does not expressly authorize consideration of
such factors in its enforcement. 13
Judicial recognition of such considerations only serves to nar-
row still further the scope of Section 7. At the outset confined in
its application to one form of corporate consolidation, then re-
duced to a, trap to catch the unwary by the decisions permitting
simultaneous property acquisition, now restricted to a small
fraction of cases by conflicting interpretations of the word "sub-
stantially", the Section has been practically squeezed out of ef-
fective existence by the possibility of escape afforded any defend-
ant who can show the court that the consolidation is probably
harmless. Furthermore, the benefits intended to be derived from
enforcement by a body of fact-finding experts composing the
Trade Commission vanish now that it appears that the ultimate
conclusion as to what is reasonable rests with the Supreme Court
and that the conclusions of the Commission will bear little
weight until approved by the highest tribunal.
Either the legislative intent embodied in the Section is so in-
adequately expressed as to render enforcement impossible 3
without resort to such considerations as the "public interest,"
or else there exists a fundamental disagreement as to the most
effective means by which to achieve certain sweeping but ill-de-
fined economic advantages. Yet the Supreme Court has itself
emphasized the fact that the legislative words are plain and un-
ambiguous, and that in themselves they furnish adequate proce-
dural standards 5 Moreover, in the first important case which
arose under Section 7,31 the Court indicated that it was not out
32Supra note 14, at 93.
33 "If an exception to the operation of the statute ought and is to be
raised in cases where the concern whose stock is acquired is small and wea,
or for any reason udikely long to endure, it must come through statutory
enactment and not by judicial construction." Alschuler, J., in Svift & Co.
v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 27, at 599 (italics ours).
86 This is the contention of Felix H. Levy in A Decado of the Fcdorar
Trade Comirssion (1924) 11 VA. L. REV. 21, 111, 196, 278, 372.
35 Supra note 26.
so Aluminum Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 284 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 3d,.
1922), certiorari denied, 261 U. S. 616, 43 Sup. Ct. 362 (1923). In this
case, two competing companies A and B jointly created a third company
(in which A held two thirds of the capital stock) and B secured one third
by selling to C that part of its business which had competed v ith A. The
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of sympathy with the general legislative purpose when it went
so far as to sustain a conviction, based on an extension of the
Section beyond its precise language. That the Court should now
feel itself compelled to interpret the Section in the hazy light of
"public interest" would seem to indicate a questioning of the
desirability of the immediate legislative purpose for which such
definite provision is made-namely, the indiscriminate curbing
of monopolies and the protection of competition as an end in
itself.
An actively critical attitude on the part of the Court may be
condemned as judicial usurpation of legislative function, or be-
cause it here results in the inevitable emasculation of a beneficial
if imperfect law. It may be supported as a progressive and cour-
ageous stand for principles more in keeping with an industrial
age than those which lie behind the written Act. Somewhere
between these two extremes is the probable explanation of the
court's action. For judicial application of a statute is tempered
by a composite of influences. Not only the popular and official
attitude of several years ago, which found expression in the anti-
trust statutes, is to be reckoned with here, but also the permeat-
ing spirit of the old common law which permitted reasonable
"restraints of trade", and the post-war popular indifference to
mergers and big business combinations. If the ardor for trust-
busting has been mollified by a realization that there are evils in
rate wars and cut-throat competition s3 and benefits in large-scale
production which decreases over-head expenditures, recognition
of the change of emphasis will not be openly expressed in the
opinions of the Court, but will be concealed behind legal ration-
alizations made necessary by strict statutory wording. The de-
cision in the Internatianal Shoe Co. case need not therefore be
considered a conscious effort to debilitate a bad law, nor to read
into existing legislation a definite economic policy. It is rather
an indication of judicial tolerance of popular ideas, reflecting a
general acceptance of modern industrial methods.
-EFFECT OF INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE UPON PROVISION FOR LIMITED
LIABILITY IN CASE OF SUICIDE
The case of Fore v. New York Life Ins. Co.," recently decided
by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, raises the interesting ques-
tion of whether the incontestable clause of a life insurance
commission found that the result of this deal was a lessening of competi-
tion between A and B and ordered A to divest itself of all the stock held
in C. 3 Fed. Trade Com. Dec. 302 (1921).
37 Compare the attitude of the courts in England towards cut-throat com-
petition. Attorney-General of Australia v. Adelaide S. S. Co., 15 C. L. R.
65 (1912), aff'd, [1913] A. C. 781.
'22 S. W. (2d) 401 (Ark. 1929).
[Vol. 391050
90]COMMENTS
policy -continues to operate after the suicide of the insured to
defeat a provision for limited liability for suicide occurring
within a specified period. It appeared that the decedent had
applied for and received an insurance policy upon his life naming
his wife as beneficiary thereunder. The policy provided: "In
case of self-destruction during the first two insurance years,
whether the insured be sane or insane, the insurance under this
policy shall be a sum equal to the premiums thereon which have
been paid to and received by the company, and no more." It
was also provided that the policy should be incontestable after
two years from its date of issue with certain named exceptions.
Approximately twenty-two months after the issuance of the
policy the insured committed suicide. Some time after the expi-
ration of the two year period the beneficiary brought an action
against the company to recover the face amount of the policy.
The company answered alleging death by suicide, to which an-
swer the plaintiff demurred, setting up the incontestable clause.
The beneficiary had judgment in the lower court for the total
amount of the premiums paid, which amount the company had
tendered, but upon appeal recovery was granted for the face
value of the policy, the court holding that the incontestable
clause operated as a short statute of limitations controlling the
suicide clause.
The dissenting opinion pointed out that "it is not a contest of
the policy to insist that only that liability be enforced which un-
der the contract the company assumed."2 This view is well sup-
ported by cases in other jurisdictions ' which distinguish a con-
test of the original validity of the policy from an insistence upon
the limited liability which the contract of insurance expressly
assumed.
The validity of a policy may -be contested by reason of fraud,
misrepresentation, breach of warranty, the failure to perform
a condition precedent or the occurrence of a condition subse-
quent.4 But these defenses should not be confused with risks
expressly excepted or excluded from the policy." Fraud, mis-
2 Ibicd 404.
3 See cases cited infra notes 12 and 18. Although these cases deal vith
different wordings of the suicide clause all protect the company. Note
(1926) 11 MIN. L. REv. 254.
4 It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the various kinds of provisions, the
materiality of the breach or non-performance, or the statutes controlling
the subject. These are fully discussed in 4 COuCH, CYCLOMIA OF INSIl-
ANcE LAw (1929) c. 13.
5 "An insurance company or benefit sdciety has the right to select the
particular risks it is willing to assume and there is no public policy aguinst
a contract exempting insurance company in advance from liability for the
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representation and breach of warranty or condition may create
in the insurer a power to extinguish existing legal relations un-
der the contract, and the power so created may be subsequently
destroyed by reason of an express waiver, laches, estoppel, or
the operation of the incontestable clause. But the exception
of a described risk by the terms of the policy, creates not a
power but an entire immunity in the insurer from any liability
for the risk so excluded, unless provision is made for reduced
liability. An exception, therefore, is not waived by the opera-
tion of law, as, for example, by reason of laches, since no lia-
bility, defeasible or otherwise, was ever assumed., It is con-
ceded that the line is frequently difficult to draw.
A recent case in New York 8 indicates with notable precision
the distinction made above. There an insurance company sub-
mitted for approval to the state superintendent of insurance a
rider which provided that: "Death as a result of service travel
or flight in any species of aircraft, except as a fare-paying pas-
senger, is not a risk assumed under this policy; but, if the in-
sured shall die as a result, directly or indirectly, of such service,
travel or flight, the company will pay to the beneficiary the re-
serve on this policy." Approval of this rider was refused on
the ground that it was inconsistent with the incontestable clause
prescribed by New York Insurance Law.9 In certiorari proceed-
ings the company prevailed in the Appellate Division,0 which
result was affirmed in the Court of Appeals. The opinion, de-
livered by Chief Judge Cardozo, clearly distinguishes between
"a denial of coverage and a defense of invalidity." The clause
here proposed related not to the validity of the policy but to
the coverage or risk assumed thereunder, and therefore was in
no wise inconsistent with the incontestable clause.
In the construction of the suicide clause similar language has
been used. Thus in Mack v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.,1
the court said:
"The contract provision expressly excluding the assumption of
the risk of suicide for two years is entirely distinct from the
,death due to certain specified causes." 6 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE (2d
ed. 1928) 5182.
6Usuahry provision is made for the return of premiums paid. This
should be regarded as in a sense a separate contract of coverage for the
risk excluded from the main coverage of the policy.
7 Professor Vance propounds this line of reasoning in the second edition
of his work on Insurance which is to be published shortly. VANCE, INSUR-
ANCE (2d ed. 1930) 822.
8 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Conway, 252 N. Y. 449, 169 N. E.
642 (1930); (1930) 30 CoL. L. REv. 572.
9 N. Y. CoNs. LAWS c. 28 § 101.
10 226 App. Div. 408, 235 N. Y. Supp. 501 (3d Dep't 1929).
1112 F. (2d) 416, 418 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
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incontestable clause, is consistent with it, and the one in no way
contradicts the other. There is a distinction between facts which
would warrant a rescission of the contract and a risk not covered
by the contract. The incontestable clause relates to the former.
The suicide clause relates to the latter."
Whenever the suicide clause provides that suicide "is not a
risk assumed" under the policy, it would seem that the above
result should not be difficult to reach.12 Yet there are decisions
in which the incontestable clause has been held to override such
an express exception. These cases are possibly distinguishable,
however, since the exclusion of the risk of suicide from the
policy was without time limitation and the suicide occurred after
the expiration of the period of limitations contained in the in-
contestable clause.1 3 In theory, however, where a risk has been
excluded from the coverage of the policy, the insurance com-
pany should in no event be held liable upon the occurrence of
that risk.14 But the very existence of these cases demonstrates
the caution with which theoretical distinctions must be made,
especially in cases of life insurance contracts which are so
strictly construed against the insurer1 In partial explanation
of these decisions the suggestion may be hazarded that few
courts are inclined to regard with favor the exclusion of the
22The following cases sustain this interpretation. Mack v. Connecticut
General Life Ins. Co., supra note 11; Howard v. Missouri State Life Ins.
Co., 289 S. W. 114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Hearin v. Standard Life Ins.
Co., 8 F. (2d) 202 (D. Ark. 1925); Wright v. Philadelphia Life Insurance
Co., 25 F. (2d) 514 (D. S. C. 1927).
l3 1Mareck v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 6Z Minn. 39, 64 N. W. 63
(1895); Seymour v. Mutual Protective League, 155 IIL App. 21 (1910);
Mutual Reserve Fund Ass'n v. Payne, 32 S. W. 1063 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895);
Court of Honor v. Updegraff, 68 IEan. 474, 75 Pae. 477 (1904); North-
western Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 254 U. S. 96, 41 Sup. Ct. 47
(1920) (policy "void" in the event of suicide). Contra: Childress v.
Fraternal Union of America, 113 Tenn. 252, 82 S. W. 832 (1904). This
case is distinguishable, however, since the risk of suicide was not totally
excluded but the amount payable to the beneficiary was reduced to one-
third of the amount otherwise due.14 Thus in Childress v. Fraternal Union of America, supra note 13, at
255, 82 S. W. at 833, it is said: "The incontestable clause has no refer-
ence to the suicide clause, and the latter is in no wise affected by the
former. If the insured commit suicide after the expiration of the two
years from the date of the policy, the effect is the same as if it occur within
two years." In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, supra note 8, at 463,
169 N. E. at 643, it was stated: "Where there has been no assumption
of the risk there can be no liability . . . (citing cases) . . . The
kind of insurance one has at the beginning, that, but no more, ole retains
until the end!'
Is The distinction here drawn between 'representations, warranties, con-
ditions etc. and exceptions in insurance policies is not, however, intended
to be theoretical but factual.
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suicide risk for the entire life of the policy. Thus the incon-
testable clauc ,'uld seem to be a means to circumvent the
strict provision. But, however that may be, the importance of
these cases is now rapidly diminishing since the suicide clause
in most policies issued at the present time excludes that risk
only for one or two years from the date of the policy (usually
for the same period as that specified in the incontestable
clause). 16 Under this wording of the clause the problem of a
subsequent suicide does not arise, that risk being included in
the insurance coverage. 17
Frequently, instead of expressly excepting the risk, the sui-
cide clause provides, as in the Fore case, that in the event of
suicide the amount payable under the policy is limited or reduced
-usually to the amount of premium paid. Under such a clause
the question arises whether suicide is to be treated as an ex-
cepted risk or as a condition in the policy. The greater number
of decisions hold that this clause restricts the liability of the
company and that, in refusing to pay more than the reduced
amount, the company does not contest the validity of the policy
but merely insists upon payment in accordance with its express
contract terms.21 The effect, therefore, is that the risk of suicide
16 But "A contest made within two years is not to be confused with a
defense of death by suicide committed within two years. In the incontest-
able clause, the two year period is a period of limitation . . . But in
the suicide clause the two year period is a period of exclusion of risk on
account of suicide." Mack v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., supra note
11, at 418. In Stean v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 24 N. M. 346, 171 Pac.
786 (1918) the period in the suicide clause was two years while the period
of contestability was only one. The suicide occurred after the elapse of
one year but before two years had passed. The clauses were held distinct
and the company protected.
-17The policy under consideration in the Fore case reduced the liability
of the company for suicide occurring during the first two policy years.
Yet the opinion cites as authority and quotes extensively from the case of
Mareck v. Mutual Reserve Fund Ass'n, supra note 13, in which the risk
of suicide was totally excluded from the policy. Furthermore, as pointed out
above, the suicide in the latter ease occurred after the five year period
of contestability. In Meyers v. Liberty Life Insurance Co., 124 Kan. 191,
197, 257 Pac. 93, 936, (1927), discussing the Mareck case, the court says:
"The case is well decided. It did riot decide that a contestable clause in an
insurance policy nullifies a clause providing that the risk of suicide is not
assumed; it merely decided that, under the circumstances stated, the incon-
testable clause under consideration applied, and the company was liable
for the face amount of the policy. The case is frequently cited as estab-
lishing a principle of universal application." Upon substantially the same
facts the court in the Meyers case reached the opposite conclusion from
that of the Arkansas court.
IS Meyers v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., supra note 17; North American
Union v. Tranner, 138 Ill. App. 586 (1908); Scales v. Jefferson Standard
Zife Ins. Co., 155 Tenn. 413, 295 S. W. 58 (1926); Woodbery v. New York
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is excepted from the main coverage of the policy and by express
provision is covered in another manner providing for reduced
liability.
The result of the decision in the Arkansas case is that the in-
contestable clause continues to operate for the benefit *of the
beneficiary after the suicide of the insured. This result has
been reached many times where the insured has died within the
period of limitation in the incontestable clause and the company
has denied liability on the basis of fraud. 0 In such cases, how-
ever, different considerations are involved, not the least of which
is that tha company may begin an investigation of fraud from
the very inception of the policy and may contest it at any time
within the period established by the incontestable clause even
if the insured does not die.20 But the company cannot contest
a policy on the ground of suicide until that very act occurs and
it may have little or no time to do so if the suicide takes place
near the end of the period. Furthermore, as many decisions
point out, to contest the policy for fraud is to deny its original
validity, whereas to deny more than limited liability in the event
of suicide is merely to insist upon the contract obligation of the
company as expressly provided in the policy. Too frequently
the fraud cases are cited as authority for similar holdings in
suicide cases.21
Many of the difficulties enumerated above are eliminated by
the form of the incontestable clause now adopted by many com-
panies and required by statute in several states. This form of
the clause provides that the policy shall be incontestable after.
it has been "in force during the lifetime of the insured" for a
Life Ins. Co., 129 Misc. Rep. 365, 221. N. Y. Supp. 357 (Sup. Ct. 1927). As
tersely expressed in Stean v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., supra note 16, at
349, 171 Pac. at 787, "the suicide clause is not one which enters into the
validity of the policy but one which limits the right of recovery after the
full existence of the contract is established."
19 The rule that the company must contest the policy for fraud within
the period of limitation despite the death of the insured within the period-
is practically universal. The leading case is Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni
Packing Co., 263 U. S. 162, 44 Sup. Ct. 90 (1923). Minnesota is the only
state which holds to the contrary, viz., that the death of the insured within
the period fixes the rights of the parties. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v.
Aaron, 158 Minn. 359, 197 N. W. 757 (1924). On this subject see Note
(1930) 15 CoRN. L. Q. 298.
20 But see Cooper, Incontestable Life Insurance (1924) 19 ILL L. RBu.
226, 240, who argues hgainst the rule permitting the incontestable clause
to run in favor of the beneficiary even in fraud cases.
21 Thus Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Robbs, 177 Ark. 275, 6 S. W. (2d) 520
(1928), upon which the instant Arkansas case relies, cites the case of
Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Cranford, 161 Ark. 602, 257 S. W.'66 (1923).
It is interesting to note that an action on the identical policy in the Robbs
1930] 1055
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named period.2 2 Under this wording of the clause the rights
of both the insurer and the beneficiary become fixed upon the
death of insured by suicide or otherwise within the period estab-
lished.2 3  While the suicide clause itself should dispose of the
risk of self-destruction independently of the incontestable clause,
the use of this form of the incontestable clause will protect com-
panies against such decisions as that reached by the Arkansas
Court.
case had previously been instituted in the Federal courts and a demurrer
to the complaint sustained. Hearin v. Standard Life Ins. Co., supra note
12.
22 See Note (1930) 15 CoRN. L. Q. 298, 301. This is the 'wording in
Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Conway, eupra note 8, set out in full above.
N. Y. CONS. LAwS c. 28 § 101; ILL. Rnv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 73
§ 261 (3). See Note (1930) 15 CoRN. L. Q. 298, 301.23 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 31 F. (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929);
ef. M Kenna v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 220 App. Div. 53, 220 N. Y.
Supp. 568 (2d Dep't 1927) ("in force").
